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I

n the first of four lectures on Nietzsche’s philosophy, “The Will to Power
as Art” (1936-37), Heidegger argues that the unique and important
relationship between truth and art, which Nietzsche suggests, must be
understood “with a view to the conquest of nihilism,”1 i.e., within the historical
context of a radically novel interpretation of sensuous reality. Beginning with
the project of overturning Platonism as the active countermovement to nihilism,
this essay interprets Heidegger’s difficult notion of the discordant relationship
between truth (the fixation of semblance) and art (the transfiguration of
semblance) in Nietzsche’s philosophy, emphasizing the supreme importance of
art as life’s greatest enhancing force. The analysis is conducted within the
context of Nietzsche’s metaphysics as presented by Heidegger, who claims that
as a metaphysical thinker, Nietzsche could not explain such topics as “truth,”
“Being,” and “Becoming” in terms beyond the conceptualization of Western
philosophy. In spite of that, his thought intimates a movement beyond the
constraints of the tradition within which he was entrenched. In addition to
providing a detailed exegesis of Heidegger’s lecture course, the problems
associated with Heidegger’s metaphysical interpretation of Nietzsche’s
philosophy will be discussed, problems that commentators such as Alan Schrift
(Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation) believe stem from Heidegger’s
stringent and restrictive methodological choices for approaching the reading of
Nietzsche.2
What is Nietzsche’s understanding of nihilism? What is the
significance of waging an aesthetic war against this negative cultural force?
Attending to such questions will clarify Nietzsche’s unique conception of art as
1 Martin Heidegger, “The Will to Power as Art,” in Nietzsche, trans. by D. F. Krell,
[Volumes 1 & 2] (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 161.
2 Alan Schrift, Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation: Between Hermeneutics and
Deconstruction (New York: Routledge, 1990), 14-20. It must be noted that Shrift’s critique, in the
tradition of Heidegger’s “critical confrontation” with Nietzsche, focuses not only on the
problematic aspects of Heidegger’s reading,, but also elucidates the supreme strength of
Heidegger’s interpretation. Schrift’s brilliant and detailed critique acknowledges the debt to
which philosophy owes Heidegger for his monumentally influential interpretation of Nietzsche.
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a countermovement to nihilism, which finds its expression in the task of
overturning Platonism. Nietzsche’s determination to act against Platonism is
presented as a “fundamental experience, that is, his growing insight into the
basic developments of [his] history.”3 Accordingly, Nietzsche’s work to
overturn Platonism unfolds on historical, rather than theoretical grounds.
Nihilism, he recognizes, is the historical development in which the “highest
values devaluate themselves.”4 The supposed guarantors of “Being” and “truth,”
i.e., theism (faith), philosophical rationalism (reason), and science/technology
(logical empiricism) lose legitimacy and force. They prove inadequate to the
task of categorically explaining the vast complexities of existence because they
are driven by the following erroneous assumptions: (1) The belief that the
universe in explainable in definitive terms, it has “aim” and “purpose,” and (2)
The belief that a unified system of thought exists that explains the “true”
nature of the universe in its totality. All such disciplines, holding complete
optimism in the power of truth, must ultimately fall short of their unrealistic
goal of attaining complete knowledge of the world, which according to
Nietzsche, is in fact beyond definitive explanation. “Theoretical optimism,”
the belief in the possibility of absolute knowledge, must breakdown when
rendered ineffectual through encounters with phenomena that defy its
explanations. This process of knowledge becoming ineffectual is what
Nietzsche means when referring to the nihilistic devaluation of values, and
whether acknowledged or not, it is the decisive moment when “logic twists
around itself and finally bites itself in the tail.”5 As the cataclysmic event of
nihilism pervades the entirety of Western history, it precludes authentic
ecumenical goals from grounding a culture’s formation and forward
projection.6
Nietzsche traces the growth of nihilism from Plato’s philosophy of the
Ideas (forms) through the dominant interpretation of Plato’s corpus, in the
form of Platonism, which amounts to a drastic reinterpretation of Plato’s
original philosophy, wherein Plato’s thought becomes, “more refined, more
enticing, more incomprehensible,” namely Christian.7 In the modern age, the
metaphysical interpretation of the “true-apparent” distinction is taken to the
extreme in the Christian world-view. Unlike Plato’s teachings, Christianity
Heidegger, Nietzsche, 155-156.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Will to Power, trans. by W. Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale
(New York: Vintage,1969), Section 2.
5 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, trans. by Shaun Whiteside (London: Penguin
Books, 1993), 75.
6 Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Philosopher as Cultural Physician,” in Nietzsche and Truth:
Selection from his Notebooks of the Early 1870’s, trans. by Daniel Breazeale (New Jersey: Humanities
Press, 1979), 75. Nietzsche did not believe that an authentic culture could ever be grounded in
the truths of science or religion. He even argues that philosophy is also inadequate to the task of
founding a culture: “It is not possible to base a popular culture on philosophy. Thus, in relation
to a culture, philosophy can always be of second, but never of primary significance.” Instead, he
claims that true culture demands for its unifying center an art or an artwork, and thus envisages
the artist as the best possible candidate for cultural founder.
7 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols/The Anti-Christ, trans. by R. J. Hollingdale
(Penguin: London, 1991), 50-51.
3
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believes that “true Being” is no longer attainable through corporeal means, e.g.,
the wisdom and piety of the philosopher, and is instead promised in a glorious
after-life, most specifically to “the sinner who repents.”8 Christianity views
earthly habitation as something negative, and worse, sinful, something to be
transcended in order to reach a higher state of existence within the incorporeal
realm of spirit (super-sensuous). Christianity denigrates the body, relegating
the sensuous to a position of lowly rank. The implications that accompany this
dualistic metaphysical world view are both epistemological and axiological in
scope. According to Nietzsche, with Christianity comes the erroneous and
pernicious view that the “true world” (truth) relates to the moral valuation of
“good” and the “apparent world” (falsity) relates to the moral valuation of
“evil.”
At the backdrop of this Platonist-Christian (Platonism) privileging of
the super-sensuous world, Nietzsche attempts to return to the realm of the
senses which involves an overturning of the Platonic world view. What ensues
is a revaluation of the metaphysical standard of truth and an initiation towards
a “physiological” aesthetics. At first glance, positivism appears to accomplish
such a move as described, for positivism inverts Platonism’s value system by
removing the super-sensuous from a position of importance, no longer
designating it as “true Being.” In its place, empirical presentation (positum)
becomes the new “truth” standard of reality. Nevertheless, positivism is not a
radical overcoming of Platonism in the Nietzschean sense, for it continues the
proliferation of nihilism, and like its counterpart, embraces the unnatural
bifurcation of existence, i.e., the comparative ideal of the “true world” against
which values are measured and judged. Although positivism casts aside the
ideal of the super-sensuous as the “true world,” it retains the ideal of the “true
world,” and along with it the “blueprint of an ‘above and below.’”9 Positivism
continues to operate within Platonism’s system of hierarchy. Empirical
validation becomes the gold standard establishing the world of “appearances”
(in this case, the super-sensuous world), as that which constitutes all things
which are not truly in Being. Initially, Nietzsche’s undertaking seems to repeat
the move of positivism, i.e., establishing the “sensual” as the criterion for
determining “True reality.” However, Nietzsche does not intend to establish
an alternative form of positivism by merely reversing the structure of
knowledge. Rather, he seeks to attack the root of nihilism, abolishing the
destructive “essence” of Platonism – the distinction between “true and
apparent” world.
In addition to the aforementioned epistemological implications
associated with attacking the essence of Platonism, for Nietzsche, there are
crucial physiological and psychological issues that emerge from this analytic
endeavor, which are directly linked with the concerns of axiology. Nietzsche
believes that the overturning of Platonism’s world view rescues the sensate
realm from its maligned and devalued status, a world linked directly to the
8
9

Ibid., 50-51.
Heidegger, Nietzsche, 207.
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corporeal “body,” and elevates it to a place of prominence in a renovated,
renewed, and re-valued conception of human existence. As opposed to viewing
the body as a “phenomenon that accompanies thinking, a phenomenon
furthermore, that has a rather inhibited effect on the clarity of thinking,”10
Nietzsche embraces the body as the medium through which thought transpires,
and beyond, as the ground from out of which all of our activities and advanced
states of being emerge, from thought and language to the superlative
transfiguration of our world through art. Since Nietzsche’s project of revaluation is genealogically concerned with a return to the origins of our
psychological motivations and the values we attach to these psychological
states, he is ultimately concerned with whether or not the artist’s psychological
motives to create emerge out of life-affirming drives or life-negating drives, out
of modes of attunement that are valuable or detrimental to the overall
enhancement of life’s power. Clearly, for Nietzsche, Platonism fosters a
nihilistic environment wherein the creative psychological drives, those
conducive to the most fecund and efficacious discharge of the will-to-power,
are subjugated in the service of other-worldly aspirations, and here Nietzsche
locates the pernicious drive to deny life, which results in the decline and
atrophy of the will-to-power and the human’s creative spirit.
Nietzsche envisages the authentic overturning of Platonism as the “zenith” of
world history, punctuating the “end of the longest error.”11 How is it possible
to consider this historical event as humankind’s greatest hour given the grave
implications of the complete overturning of values hitherto? For once the “true
world” is abolished, so too is the concept of the “apparent world,” and since
these worlds together form what ultimately “stands opposed to pure
nothingness,” it follows that nihilism will rise to engulf humanity. Not so,
assures Heidegger, for Nietzsche’s philosophy works to overcome nihilism in
even its most drastic manifestations. It is during this time that humanity is
faced with the choice of either remaining passive before nihilism’s oppression
(the Last Man) or responding actively, in the form of the Übermensch, striving to
overcome the previous relationship of humanity to its existence. Although
often conceived as a super-human entity, the Übermensch is certainly not “some
miraculous, fabulous being.” Rather, as Heidegger notes, the “overman” is a
high-bred of the philosopher and artist who surmounts the condition of
“unsubdued nihilism,” transcending the Last Man, whose “Dasein and relation
to Being have been determined by Platonism in one of its forms or by a
mixture of these.”12 The Übermensch response calls for the establishment of
new values and standards of ground. This new value-structure receives its
impetus from the drives of the “biological,” or physiological, that which is
valued precisely for its benefit to life. “In valuations,” writes Nietzsche, “are
expressed conditions of preservation and growth.”13 Values are ultimately
10

Daniela Vallega-Neu, The Bodily Dimension in Thinking (New York: SUNY, 2005), 21-

37.
Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols/The Anti-Christ, 50-51.
Heidegger, Nietzsche, 208.
13 Nietzsche, Will to Power, Section 507.
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decided by life as will to power, a perpetual striving and willing of conditions that
facilitate the unremitting drive to enhance its power.
According to Heidegger’s interpretation, Nietzsche’s conception of
“reality” reinstates the sensuous as the basic character of existence, labeling it
“perspectival-perceptual.”14 Reality consists of a large number of forces
(perspectives), joined and linked together, striving in contention, each asserting
a unique perspective and assessing other perspectives in terms of the “capacity
for life.”15 Each living being has its own configuration of drives, forces, and
ways of manifesting its presence, of showing, or “shining.” That which shows
itself via the sensuous is termed “semblance” (Schein), and this radiating of a
things’ perspective is part and parcel of the world of appearances (die scheinbare
Welt). Bringing the idea of semblance into the essence of reality, Nietzsche
attempts to expunge the pejorative connotations that the tradition has attached
to the concept of “appearance.” It is within this new interpretation of reality,
or “sensuousness,” that the relation between truth and art takes on
significance. Grounded in this singular, multi-perceptual reality, each a mode
of perspectival-shining (Scheinen), truth is conceived as the fixation of
semblance (Anschein) and art as the scintillating transfiguration of semblance
(Aufscheinen).
As Heidegger argues, Nietzsche conceives truth as a “justified and
necessary condition of the assertion of life.”16 Truth as fixed semblance gives
rise to the concept of the “object,” i.e., things with a constant and enduring
quality. Truth allows beings to establish themselves amid change as they work
to master the environment. Although he conceptualizes truth as Anschein
(apparition), it is not opposed to reality, and instead refers to that which shows
itself as fixed appearance, securing what the will to power has gathered and
acquired. Admittedly, Heidegger claims that Nietzsche holds a unique view of
truth (e.g., “error,” “illusion,” “metaphor,” “lie”) and is skeptical of
“theoretical” idealism’s claim to possess the absolute certainty of knowledge,
i.e., the undying faith in the correspondence model of truth and the ability of
propositions to accurately picture reality, demonstrating the “adequate
expression of an object within a subject.”17 However, Heidegger’s contention
that truth for Nietzsche is determined exclusively by knowledge, and further,
that Nietzsche’s understanding of truth as “fixed semblance” firmly locates
him in the company of such philosophers as Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes,
who concern themselves with truth as demonstrating a constancy in presence,
representing that which is known because it satisfies the essence of truth, is not
without contention among commentators.
In essence, Heidegger claims that for Nietzsche, “Truth is the truth of
knowledge,” i.e., the truth of what is truly known “is established as something
true in, by, and for knowledge alone.” (149). According to Heidegger, as will
Heidegger, Nietzsche, 213.
Ibid, 212.
16 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 215.
17 Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense,” Nietzsche and Truth: Selection
from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870’s, 86.
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be addressed, Nietzsche overlooks the greater ontological concern of the
essence of truth and the truth of essence because he pursues truth strictly in
terms of epistemology, and much like traditional philosophy, locates truth in
the domain of knowledge. It is necessary to interrogate Heidegger’s negligent
glossing of Nietzsche’s early interpretations of truth (e.g., “Truth and Lies in an
Non-Moral Sense”), wherein the discourse on truth is actually grounded in the
philological understanding of rhetoric, semiotics, and the notion of metaphor
as a supreme form of creative, imaginative linguistic transference. In these
early writings Nietzsche espouses a radically skeptical view of the possibility of
acquiring “truth” as previously conceived by the metaphysical-epistemological
tradition. Arguing against Heidegger, Schrift identifies the following aspects of
Nietzsche’s radical theory of truth, which Schrift claims locates Nietzsche
outside the aforementioned philosophical tradition: (1) Nietzsche’s critique of
the referential nature of language and his extreme skepticism toward the
traditional correspondence model of truth, and (2) Nietzsche’s understanding
of the aesthetic nature of “truth” as emerging through the creative, imaginative
use of language. Importantly, as relating to the purpose of criticizing
Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche’s understanding of truth, relying as it does on
the Nachlass and Will to Power, Schrift states the following: “Nietzsche’s
reflections on language function as an essential component of his later
thinking.”18
For Nietzsche, language constructs the laws of truth, it allows the
“clever beasts” to invent knowing, but the notion of “truth” in this instance, as
Nietzsche is careful to point out, is at odds with “truth” as conceived by
traditional epistemology, i.e., knowledge established through the
correspondence model, which expresses, by way of a proposition, the valid
relationship between a subjective “representation” and the objective “state-ofaffairs.” As Schrift points out, the correspondence model works off the
mistaken assumption that language, “stands in some sort of privileged relation
(adequatio) to an extralinguistic referent or meaning (‘reality’), i.e., language, that
which conceptually structures the world in the first instance, holds the power
to provide us with ‘true’ information about things that are situated outside of
language.”19 Nietzsche argues against any referential accuracy inherent to
language, for he believes that an unsurmountable gap exists between words and
things. This notion is directly related to Nietzsche’s critique of the
correspondence model, which operates according to the flawed logic that there
is an “objective referent” outside the locution, as if it were possible to speak of
an objective referent outside the metaphorical relationship language establishes.
As Nietzsche reasons, “We believe that we know something about things
themselves when speak of trees, colors, snow, and flowers; and yet we possess
nothing but metaphors for things,”20 and these metaphors do not express a
relationship of identity between “words” and the original entities. In order for
Schrift, Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation, 138.
Ibid., 133.
20 Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense,” Philosophy and Truth: Selections
From Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870's, 83.
18
19
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the correspondence model to have validity, it would need to grant legitimate
access to the essence of things, the “thing-in-itself,” so that the accuracy with
which the locution corresponded to this so-called “essence” could be
determined, and, as Nietzsche claims, this is an impossible feat.
In “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense,” Nietzsche presents an
analysis of the manner in which human concepts arise as constructs of a
linguistic nature, most specifically that of metaphor formation. The process
can be understood as tripartite in structure, involving a movement, or
transference, from one realm of perception to another, “a triple metaphorical
transference from nerve impulse to image to words to concept.”21 According
to Schrift, since each sphere involves a move from one “language” to another,
this rules out “a legitimate relation, or literal translation between spheres.”22
Thus, for Nietzsche, complete descriptive analysis, wherein it is possible to
determine legitimate truth-value, is impossible. The concepts we form and
incorporate in our attempts to know the world are always at a remove from the
original perceptual experiences that ground the move to abstraction, for even
at the level of the initial perception, when “a nerve stimulus is transferred into
image,”23 metaphor formation is at work. As stated, Nietzsche claims that
there are no externally valid descriptions of real things, of anything resembling
the essence of things, because language does not hold the ability to accurately
capture reality. “For between two absolutely different spheres,” writes
Nietzsche, “as between subject and object, there is no causality, no correctness,
there is at most, an aesthetic relation.”24 Although Heidegger locates Nietzsche
in the company of such philosophers as Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes, who all
believe that truth is properly determined by knowledge and that the possibility
for legitimate knowledge exists, Nietzsche’s radical theory of knowledge
drastically contradicts the responses the aforementioned philosophers have
given to the questions concerning the origin, reliability, and criterion for
knowledge, i.e., the concerns of epistemology proper. Nietzsche is not only
skeptical of knowledge in the traditional sense, but is outright nihilistic about
the possibility of both “gaining knowledge” and the value of the idealized quest
to attain it.25
As opposed to the traditional notion of truth that seeks to overcome
any and all illusions, which settles for nothing less than categorical certainty in
all matters of truth, Nietzsche adopts a “naturalistic” and “instrumental”
conception of truth. As described by Daniel Breazeale, this is the
understanding that the human requires the aid of “life preserving fictions,
which apparently must be believed to be true if they are to serve their intended
function.”26 However, “believing” these life preserving fictions is not the same
Schrift, Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation, 132.
Ibid., 126.
23 Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense,” Philosophy and Truth: Selections
From Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the 1870's, 82.
24 Ibid., 86.
25 Ibid., 27, (trans. bylator Daniel Breazeale’s Comments).
26 Ibid, 33.
21
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as investing them with objective, categorical truth-value. Nietzsche is clear that
we must at all times be aware that their production requires the equating of
unequal things, based as they are on the metaphorical transference from one
perceptual realm to another. To the point, such truths are nothing but lies and
illusions we that we as humans create.27 Viewed in this manner, truths are as
illusory and false as lies, however, if we attend to Nietzsche’s “naturalist
conception” and its utility for human life, we understand that “some products
of the intellect are more valuable (“truer”) than others.”28 Ultimately, as argued
by Schrift, Nietzsche concludes that knowledge is “merely a collection of
perspectival illusions which, while necessary for the preservation of the human
species, stands as a function not of truth [epistemology] but of power,” or value.
Truth, for Nietzsche, much unlike the tradition within which he is located by
Heidegger, becomes a concern for axiology rather than a function of
epistemology.29
Heidegger’s metaphysical reading argues that Nietzsche’s intimation of
the all-important question of Being qua Being occurs in the strategic
reconciling of art and truth in the realm of “art,” wherein truth as “fixed
semblance” facilitates the will to power in its quest to overcome and
transfigure life (as fixed semblance, or “truth”). However, such an
interpretation appears to overlook the crucial issue that art is in fact situated at
the root of Nietzsche’s theory of truth as metaphor formation, i.e., truth as a
byproduct of language is always already art in that it is metaphorical,
imaginative, and creative. As Nietzsche writes, “The drive toward the
formation of metaphors is the fundamental human drive,”30 and this drive is
artistic, plain and simple. According to Nietzsche, the human being is to be
admired for its artistic powers, for it is a “genius of construction.” Whereas
other animals create their habitat with materials they collect, “man builds with
the far more delicate conceptual material which he first has to manufacture for
himself.”31 Nietzsche believes that the entire conceptual schemata of the world
is born through the artistic process of metaphor construction, which streams
from “the primal faculty of human imagination like a fiery liquid.”32 However,
as Nietzsche astutely observes, many are unable to come to terms with the fact
that the human artist creates its world by way of “anthropomorphic” concepts
that do not capture anything resembling the “true essence” of things.
According to Nietzsche, outside of the human being, no objective truths exist,
and tradition philosophy ignores this, forgets this, and must do so in order to
preserve its “self-consciousness,” in order to retain its sanity and security in the

Ibid, 33.
Nietzsche, Philosophy and Truth: Selection From Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870's,
32, (trans. bylator Daniel Breazeale’s Analysis).
29 Schrift, Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation, 138.
30 Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense,” Philosophy and Truth: Selection
From Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870's, 88.
31 Ibid, 85.
32 Ibid.,86.
27
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false and dangerous belief that the world can be known with utter certainty
through knowledge.33
For Nietzsche, thought is possible only by way of language, “semiotic
unities and syntactical categories,”34 which gives order to the world and
structures our understanding of it. The artistic process of giving form to our
world through language does not end with the formation of concepts. Rather,
this moment is in fact the origin of the life-long process of artistic world
creation, transformation, and self-overcoming. As Nietzsche points out, if we
are able to recognize and accept that our worldly conceptual framework is
indeed nothing beyond a creative “illusion,” i.e., as long as we are able to
momentarily deceive “ourselves without injury” in matters of truth, then we
are free for additional creative acts, free to celebrate our “Saturnalia” in artistic
world transfiguration. When the will to power is engaged in the highest task of
life, as related to the theme of metaphor formation, graduating beyond the
originary phase of concept formation, we are as artists once again playing with
metaphor, and we derive pleasure in this play which displaces “the boundary
stones of abstraction.”35 When remaking the world as an aesthetic
phenomenon, Nietzsche claims that we are “guided by intuition rather than
concepts,”36 so in essence, we are transforming and overcoming through
artistic creation that which we ourselves have originally constructed through
language. By dismantling the conceptual framework and reassembling it “in an
ironic fashion, pairing the most alien things and separating the closest,” we are
exercising the artistic drive to refashion the world of our own “aesthetic”
making.37 Thus, against Heidegger’s interpretation, it seems that prior to the
will to power overcoming and transforming though artistic activity that which
is gathered as “fixed semblance,” there is an artist always already at work in an
originary sense, creating through metaphor formation the conceptual edifice of
the world, making possible to powerful discharge of will to power in higherlevel aesthetic activity, making possible anything like the interpretation of truth
as “fixed semblance” in the first place.38
33 Nietzsche, “On the Pathos of Truth,” Philosophy and Truth: Selection From Nietzsche’s
Notebooks of the Early 1870's, 66. This so-called “drive for knowledge,” for Nietzsche, represents
the inevitable withering and death of the human’s “will to art,” the will to overcome existence.
For as Nietzsche philosophizes, “whereas knowledge attains as it final goal” in annihilation, i.e.,
the petrification of existence, “art is always more powerful than knowledge - because it desires
life.”
34 Ibid., 30 (trans. bylator Daniel Breazeale’s Analysis).
35 Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Context, Philosophy and Truth: Selection
From Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870's, 90.
36 Ibid., 90.
37 Ibid., 90.
38 Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense,” Philosophy and Truth:
Nietzsche’s Early Notebooks From the Early 1870's, 84. In relation to this discussion on truth and art
as metaphor formation, it appears that for Nietzsche, the realm of knowledge is not the domain
of truth as conceived by the tradition, but rather, truth seems to reside in a realm of artistic
intuition, where truth is defined in terms of rhetorical tropes: “What is truth? A movable host of
metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: In short, a sum of human relations which
have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished.”
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Returning to Heidegger’s analysis and the interrelation he establishes
in Nietzsche’s philosophy between art and truth, Heidegger suggests the
following: Traditional philosophy embraces truth as life’s ultimate guiding
principle, for as the logic runs, humans require truth in order to have a
meaningful life. Is it not right to demand that life, in the first instance, be
grounded and guided by truth in all of its aspects? Nietzsche vehemently
opposes such logic. Truth, he argues, is but one aspect of existence. It is
correct that life necessitates its own preservation, but also, and more
importantly, life requires enhancement in order to perpetually grow out beyond
itself. Therefore, according to Nietzsche, a life dedicated solely to the pursuit
and acquisition of truth leads to the stagnation and decay of life, as historical
nihilism testifies. Truth inhibits life’s drive to continually increase its power,
and so it is art, rather than truth, which opens the possibility of its ultimate
enhancement. For this reason Nietzsche proclaims, “We possess art lest we
perish from the truth.”39
Art is the most “transparent”40 configuration of will to power, as
expressed by the artist in the act of creation. In its most organic capacity, art
transfigures life, making it stronger, richer, and more perfect,41 effectively
opening up life for the creation of more life. Although the expression of will
to power reaches its apex in the artist, Nietzsche does not limit his conception
of aesthetics to the production of literature, music, or plastic art. Rather, he
protracts the traditional notion of art, defining creative activity as the basic
function of all living beings. Art clarifies semblance by locating a “thing in the
clarity of Being, and establishing such clarity as the heightening of life itself.”42
As “will to semblance,” art idealizes and embellishes reality, causing it to “shine
most profoundly and supremely in scintillating transfiguration.”43 Art is worth
more than truth44 because it stands closer in metaphysical proximity to life’s
innermost nature as will to power, “an expression for the Being of
Becoming.”45 Art is the principal facilitator of this essence, akin to life as a
dynamic ever-changing phenomenon, and as such, more valuable and necessary
to life than truth as fixed semblance.
Art is the secularized “spiritualization of the senses,”46 and as such, a
powerful spiritual force once liberated from the tyranny of the religious
conscience. When referring to art as “physiological,” Nietzsche is not
restricting the concept to the expression of base sensuality, that is, symbolic
Nietzsche, Will to Power, Section 822.
Ibid., Section 797. Nietzsche’s aphorism runs thus: “The phenomenon of ‘artist’ is
still the most transparent – to see through it to the basics instincts of power, nature, etc.!” This is
to say, as articulated within the “grand style,” that the highest form of creative activity, the artist
is not only expressing most obviously the will to power in action, he/she is also, and more
importantly, expressing the will to power in its most powerful and effective configuration.
41 Ibid., Section 808.
42 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 216.
43 Ibid., 161.
44 Nietzsche, Will to Power, Section 853.
45 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 233. (trans. bylator David Krell’s Analysis).
46 Nietzsche, Will to Power, Section 820.
39
40
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only of the libidinous urges at work in nature, for art is best understood as a
physiological-psychical phenomenon, encompassing both sensuous and “nonsensuous” aspects of life, an amalgam of mind, body, and spirit. Inducing
semblance to scintillate, art yields a mystical glimpse into an idealized,
perfected reality, the world is brought forth to appear in such a way that it is
“embellished.” The scintillating transfiguration of existence occurs when artist
and spectator are attuned within the aesthetic mood (Stimmung) of Rausch, or, as
David Krell translates this term, the “attunement of rapture.” This is the
intoxicated “feeling of plentitude and enhancement of force,”47 which
influences and determines one’s stance to Being as a whole. Rausch awakens
the capacity in beings to extend, or project, their Being out beyond itself in
transcendence, experiencing a “relation to Being in which beings themselves
are experienced as being made more full in Being, richer, more perspicuous,
more essential.”48
Nietzsche identifies the embellishing power of art as “Love.” This is a
dual reference to the sexual and spiritual elements of the aesthetic attunement
of Rausch. Love facilitates art’s transformation of the world, in all of its
terrifying and uncertain aspects, into something to be affirmed. Love
represents “the highest state of affirmation of existence,” and in this state of
existence even the “highest degrees of pain”49 are not excluded, and in fact
willed. When Nietzsche describes the aesthetic enthusiasm of Love’s
attunement as a form of “divination,” the classic characteristics of the mystic
(religious) experience are undeniable. Within Love’s intoxication, “the
sensations of time and space are altered,” “tremendous distances are surveyed”
50 and effortlessly apprehended, as the power of understanding is immeasurably
enhanced. Such an ecstatic experience directs “life out beyond itself,”
creatively communicating to life a new possibility of its higher law.”51 Whereas
religion once served as redemptive justification for human existence, it is for
Nietzsche art that reveals life’s highest possibilities. As the secular-spiritual
liberator of the sufferer, the man of action, and the man of knowledge,52 art is the
only authentic means of justifying existence.
As articulated, despite the fact that art and truth are both necessary for
life, as modes of perspectival-shining, it is art, due to its powers of creative
transfiguration that is significantly more valuable to life than truth. Nietzsche’s
talk of the “discordance” (Zwiespalt) between art and truth is to be understood
within this line of reasoning. Heidegger conceives discordance as the severing
in two of forces emerging from a common origin, possible “only where the
elements which sever the unity of their belonging-together diverge from one
another by virtue of that very unity.”53 It is for the sake of life’s continued
Heidegger, Nietzsche, 105.
Ibid., pg. 100.
49 Nietzsche, Will to Power, Section 852.
50 Ibid., Section 800.
51 Hiedegger, Nietzsche, 126.
52 Nietzsche Will to Power, Section 853.
53 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 217.
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enhancement that these two modes of existence must diverge and run counter
to each other. As Heidegger explains, art and truth must split in discordant
opposition to ensure the continual growth and ascendancy of life:
In order for the real (the living creature) to be real, it must
on the one hand ensconce itself within a particular
horizon, thus perduring in the illusion of truth. But in
order for the real to remain real, it must on the other hand
simultaneously transfigure itself by going beyond itself,
surpassing itself in the scintillation of what is created in
art – and that means it has to advance against the truth.54
Nietzsche explicitly states that the relationship between art and truth
arouses “holy dread.”55 Is it possible to find such discordance elsewhere in the
annals of philosophy, most specifically within the works of Plato? Heidegger
pursues this line of inquiry for the following reason: If Nietzsche’s philosophy
is to be considered the authentic “inversion,” or overturning, of Platonism, a
similar discordance, “but of a reverse sort,”56 must be found in Plato’s thought
(recall that the doctrine of the Ideas originally spawned Platonism’s nihilistic
domination).57 Attempting to locate this discordance, Heidegger examines the
dialogues of Plato, searching out the center of Plato’s metaphysics and the
conception of Being as eidos, or the Ideas, Heidegger reads the Republic and the
Phaedrus with the intent to first, clarify Plato’s definition art, Being, and truth;
and next, to explore the context in which the question of truth and art arises,
asking: In what way is art related to the truth of Being within Plato’s
philosophy? Is this relationship of a discordant nature?
Plato theorizes that the Ideas make up the constitutive nature of
existence, and such a hypothesis “presupposes the interpretation of truth as
aletheia,”58 i.e., truth as the “unconealment,” or the revelation, of Being. Within
Plato’s thought, truth and Being share an intimate bond. Since Heidegger
wants to understand art as it relates to the truth of the Being, he must first
work to ascertain the notion of art as defined by Plato. Although the ancient
Greeks did not employ a single, all-encompassing term when referring to “art,”
they did embrace a comprehensive definition of art’s nature – all art was
categorized as mimesis, or “imitation,” a form of representation in art. That
Ibid, 217
Ibid., 142. Highlighting important discordance between art and truth, Heidegger
includes a quotation from Nietzsche’s writings of 1888. Reflecting on the 1872 publication of
the Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche states, “Very early in my life I took the question of the relation of
art and truth seriously: And even now I stand in holy dread in the face of this discordance.”
56 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 181.
57 Ibid., 163. Heidegger’s questioning seeks not only to uncover the conflict between
truth (or true Being) and art (or what is portrayed in art) within Plato’s philosophy, but also
works to assist in locating Nietzsche within the history of philosophy - For only by searching out
this relationship between art and truth in philosophy’s history, will “Nietzsche’s basic
metaphysical position in its own light” come to shine.
58 Ibid., I82.
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which is properly “real” in Plato’s philosophy manifests the Ideas in varying
degrees within outward appearance, and this occurs in either one of three
forms of self-showing and ways of being produced. Plato ranks the three
modes of production in terms of their effective capacity to facilitate the
uncovering of Being. “With regard to ways of production and in light of the
pure outward appearance, Being,”59 mimesis is defined by its metaphysical
“distance” from Being.
In order to properly grasp Plato’s notion of art, or techne, as the Greeks
understood the knowledge leading to the creation of artefacts, the notion of
the world-creator in relation to the craftsperson must be elucidated. According
to Plato’s cosmogony it is god (demiourgos) who makes the kosmos as the ultimate
giver of shape to all things. Working with the forms (eidos), Plato’s god holds
in readiness the emergence of Being’s pure outward appearance in order that
the human, for example, the craftsperson, who produces things according to
the essence of their Being, is able to discern it. The craftsperson is situated on
the second tier of Plato’s hierarchy of “Being.” This because the things that are
produced, made for the sake of the people and state (demos), with the explicit
purpose of everyday use, illuminates the truth of the Ideas. The artist, who
produces only imitations of things, is thrice removed from god and true Being,
as the artist possesses neither god’s disposition over pure essence, nor the
disposition over and use of what she produces with respect to what it is, in the
manner of the craftsperson. Rather than clarifying and making possible the
revelation of Being, the artist’s creation inhibit aletheia. Due to art’s medium
and its methods of copying, transforming, and inventing, it is “exposed to the
danger of continual deception and falsehood.”60 Art, as mimesis, is therefore far
removed from the truth of Being, revealing the metaphor of “distance” in
Plato’s thought. This idea is not readily translatable into a discernable
discordance, which requires thinking art on a par with truth, i.e., as beings of
equal significance arising from a common origin.61 However, the conception of
art as presented within the Republic does not constitute Plato’s entire position
on art and beauty, and so Heidegger turns his attention to the Phaedrus, and it is
within this dialogue, amid reflections on beauty, truth, and the soul that he
uncovers the subtle discordance between art and truth to which Plato alludes.
According to Plato, human comportment presupposes the latent
understanding of Being. Since Being for Plato is a non-sensuous phenomenon,
it cannot be apprehended by the senses, and this indicates that the “soul,” or
psyche, the immaterial, immortal faculty by which humankind comprehend the
Ideas, must have at one time viewed the radiant truth of Being. The soul,
however, is estranged from the truth of the Ideas as subject to the inevitable
cycle of rebirth within the human body. As follows, within its corporeal
habitation, the soul’s understanding of Being is covered over, concealed
beneath the surface of everyday appearances. This for Plato represents the
Ibid., 185.
Heidegger, Nietzsche, 168.
61 Ibid., 189
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fundamental source of humanity’s problems. Falling prey to appearances
(aistheta) and the common opinions concerning appearances (doxa), humans
descend into the oblivion of Being and exist within a state of forgetfulness,
completely unaware that such a thing as Being exists. In order to acquire, or
more accurately, return to, an explicit understanding of Being, i.e., recognizing
that the Ideas are the direct cause of sensible appearances, a recollection of
Being (anamnesis) must occur, and it is beauty that makes such a recovery of
Being possible.
Although neither the production of art nor the work itself allows the
radiance of Being to shine forth, it is within art’s capacity to profoundly affect
the observer that Plato locates the means by which to facilitate aletheia, or the
disclosure of the Ideas. Beauty captivates through scintillating, sensuous
appearance, liberating to the “view upon Being,”62 i.e., granting humans entry
into the immediacy of the sensory appearances while simultaneously drawing
them beyond the realm of the sensuous to the realm of the super-sensuous. By
way of beauty’s entrancing power, the fleeting, radiant glimpse of Being is
arrested from the outward appearance of things. Beauty and truth belong
together, as they are related to Being, both are essential to the revelation of the
Ideas within Plato’s philosophy, “for that which truth essentially brings about,
the unveiling of Being, that and nothing else is what beauty brings about.”63
Yet this belonging together of beauty and truth is transitory in Plato’s thought,
for although beauty opens the truth of Being, it is an “aesthetic” phenomenon,
arising in the realm of the sensuous, and Being for Plato is always nonsensuous. For this reason, despite beauty’s facilitation of aletheia, the opening,
or “disclosure” of Being occurs, in a strict sense, at the site of what Plato
deems the realm of “non-being” (me on)—through the medium of sensation, in
the realm of the sensuous. It is therefore necessary that beauty and truth
diverge from each other.
When we consider very carefully that art, by bringing
forth the beautiful, resides in the sensuous, and that it is
therefore far removed from truth, it then becomes clear
why truth and beauty, their belonging together in one
notwithstanding, still must be two, must separate from
one another. But the severance, discordance in the broad
sense, is not in Plato’s view on that arouses dread; it is a
felicitous one. The beautiful elevates us beyond the
sensuous and bears us back into the true.64
Heidegger establishes that Plato, much the same as Nietzsche, thinks
art and truth in terms of their relationship to life, or Being, as emerging from
out of a common origin. This fact is crucial to Heidegger’s exegesis of
Heidegger, Nietzsche,196.
Ibid., 198.
64 Ibid.,198.
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Nietzsche’s philosophy, because discordance, as denoted by Heidegger, is
possible only when art and truth are thought in terms of “abscission,” i.e.,
growing from common ground and then branching off, one from the other. In
locating the subtle, “felicitous” discordance between art and truth within
Plato’s philosophy, Heidegger reveals the exact type of discordance required to
substantiate his claim that Nietzsche’s philosophy is best understood as an
inverted, or reversed, form of Platonism.
To understand why, in Nietzsche’s philosophy, the interaction of art
and truth arouses dread, the moment of Platonism’s abolition must be
analyzed, for at this time in history, along with the eradication of the “true”
and “apparent” worlds, the monumental occurrence of God’s death hits with
full force.65 When God, morality, philosophy, and science no longer guarantee
a complete understanding of existence in terms that are categorical, humanity is
forced to assume responsibility for its own existence. Art receives its vital
impetus from these events, and creative activity, as metaphysical activity, comes
into its own for the first time. “Existence,” states Nietzsche, “can now be
endured on within creation,”66 for art is “the only superior configuration to all
will to the denial of life (nihilism).”67 Within a world devoid of transcendent
values, the will to power conducts itself in creation, and art, the greatest
stimulant to life, the most “transparent” configuration of will to power,
emerges as the only legitimate means by which humanity enacts its life. In
assuming responsibility for its own Being, at the peak of nihilism, i.e., the
moment when God’s death hits with full force, humanity is inextricably
trapped within the discordant relationship of art and truth. The discordance
between art and truth rages in so far as it continually induces “dread,”68 that is
to say, in the desperate times of nihilism, locked within the relentless cycle of
art and truth, humanity is repeatedly thrown back upon its own self-reliant
means. Nietzsche’s rallying cry, “Art and nothing but art,”69 serves as a harsh,
yet inspirational reminder to humanity that in the midst of Becoming, forever
creating and reassessing existence, it must continually rise to the task of living
in an authentically creative manner.
If Nietzsche is to succeed in abolishing (overturning) Platonism, the
overturning “must become a twisting free of it,”70 i.e., his thought must properly
break free from the conceptual fetters of metaphysics. This, argues Heidegger,
is precisely what Nietzsche fails to accomplish, because he remains locked
within the conceptual scheme of Western philosophy. Consequently,
Nietzsche’s ideas on Being, Becoming, and truth develop in the light of
metaphysics as the result of asking the same question that has guided
philosophy since its beginnings. Avoiding the ultimate (grounding) question of
philosophy (What is Being?), which is concerned with the essence of Being, he
Heidegger, Nietzsche,217.
Nietzsche, Will to Power, Section 853.
67 Ibid., Section 853.
68 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 142, (trans. bylator David Krell’s Analysis)
69 Nietzsche, Will to Power, Section 853.
70 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 20.
65
66

J. MAGRINI

131

instead asks only the penultimate (guiding) question (What is the being?),
inquiring into the truth of beings, or the Being of beings. Pursuing the “nonessential” route, Nietzsche employs the identical system of conceptualization
that has for centuries directed philosophical inquiry. Both Being and
Becoming are thought to determine the ground of beings as such. On the one
hand, Nietzsche conceives “Being” as that which “shows itself” as fixed
appearance, or presence (ousia), as the ground of that which is, and this
represents the meaning of truth according to the tradition. On the other hand,
he conceives “Becoming” as change (genesis), that which is coming into
existence and passing away. The fact that he envisages art, as the ultimate
expression of Becoming, i.e., the transfiguration of that which shows itself in
appearance, will emerge as integral to Heidegger’s claim that Nietzsche is the
“last” of the metaphysicians.
Heidegger claims that Nietzsche conceives the fundamental character
of beings, i.e., the Being of beings, as will to power. As an unquenchable drive
to grow in strength, will to power is both “willing” and “Becoming.”71 It is not
enough to simply conceive will to power as Becoming, for according to
Heidegger’s analysis, Nietzsche philosophizes the notion that Becoming only is
Becoming in an authentic sense, if it is grounded in Being, therefore he seeks
to attach a sense of permanence to Becoming in order to legitimize it.
Nietzsche moves to “impose upon Becoming the character of Being,” which is
the ultimate will to power, and that “everything recurs is the closest
approximation to a world of Becoming to a world of Being.”72 Such reasoning
conveys the interconnectedness of will to power and the “eternal recurrence of
the same,” as expressed in the metaphysical terms of the “what” and “how” of
existence, i.e., the essentia, or “what” of beings, as will to power, and the
existentia, or “how” of beings as eternal recurrence of the same. Will to power
is the Being of beings, a Becoming that wills its return (Being) as Becoming in
the form of the eternal recurrence. “Being as permanence,” writes Heidegger,
“is to let Becoming be a Becoming.”73 Being, as the constancy of form, endures
throughout the change and flux of Becoming, and such a conception of fixed
and “enduring” presence (ousia) is to be found within his idea of truth.
According to Heidegger, although Nietzsche boldly attempts to creatively
rethink the original unity of Being and Becoming, he nonetheless retains the
oppositional nature of their “original” relationship as established by
metaphysics.
When asking the penultimate (guiding) question, Nietzsche is
simultaneously asking, “What is true?” Not formally concerned with the essence
of truth, he is inquiring into the grounds of beings along the traditional path of
path of epistemology.74 Unconcerned with the all-important primordial
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phenomenon of truth as “uncovering,”75 the tradition leaps over the primordial
conditions necessary for a thing to reveal itself in the first instance. Heidegger
traces this mistake to the failure to articulate the question of Being qua Being.
However, in Heidegger’s view, Nietzsche is not merely another astute
metaphysical thinker, but is instead the last, and perhaps, greatest of the
metaphysicians, who gathers and completes the tradition.76 How is it that
Nietzsche’s philosophy brings to a close the thought of Plato, Aristotle, and
more, the entire Western metaphysical tradition? Heidegger argues that
Nietzsche distinguishes himself “within” the tradition by intimating and
projecting philosophical concerns, which are beyond the frontiers of
metaphysics. To address this concern, Heidegger attends to the “unthought,”
that which remains “unsaid” in Nietzsche’s philosophy.77 The unthought is not
something that Nietzsche forgets, or neglects to think. Rather, it is the source
from which the entirety of his thought emerges and develops. This for
Nietzsche is the concern with the ground of beings, the Being of beings as a
whole. Heidegger reveals Nietzsche’s unique status within metaphysics by
carefully reading in correlation (1) the two questions that drive philosophical
thought and (2) the discordant relationship of art and truth as argued by
Nietzsche.
Both the penultimate question of philosophy (What is the being?) and
the ultimate question (What is Being?) ask, in an elemental way, “What is?”
Heidegger argues that the verb “is” breaks open the scope of the inquiry to
include beings as a whole and Being itself, not even the concept of
“Nothingness” remains outside the inquiry. This despite the specific focus of
each respective question. As a result, writes Heidegger, “Beings are brought
into the open region itself, and Being is conducted into the region of its
essence,” 78 i.e., into the openness of aletheia. When asking the grounding and
guiding questions of Being and beings, “we are also asking simultaneously and
inherently about essence of truth.” Thus, both questions ask what beings and
Being in “truth” are, entailing the concern with the “essence” of truth, and the
truth of “essence.” Beings in their truth are determined by will to power, and
this names the Being of beings in truth, therefore the “question concerning
75 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time. trans. by., J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson (New
York: Harper, 1962), 220/263.
76 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 4.
77 Schrift, Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation, 15. With respect to Nietzsche’s
“unthought,” Schrift relates it directly to remains “unsaid” in Nietzsche’s thought, and explains it
in the following manner: “The ‘unsaid’ attends to what, as a simple matter of fact, did not come
to be expressed by Nietzsche in the works which he saw published.” This also refers to what
can’t be “said” from inside the conceptual and linguistic schema of metaphysical philosophy.
When Heidegger refers to the “unthought” in Nietzsche, he is specifically referring to “what
remains unthought in the thinking of Western history as the history of metaphysics: Truth of
Being.” Heidegger believes that Nietzsche’s authentic thought is to be found in the Nachlass, and
so he attends to this thought, but even then Heidegger focuses mainly on “what Nietzsche
thought only in the form of what is unthought.” Schrift reduces both notions, the “unsaid” and
the “unthought” to the methodological choices structuring Heidegger’s interpretation.
78 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 68.
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truth, i.e., the question of the essence of truth, must always be inserted into the
interpretation of beings as will to power.”79 Since Being and truth are not
simply peripherally related, Heidegger must think Being and truth together,
thus he moves to identify the realm, or “domain,” in which they converge, or
presence in relation. It is within the analysis of the raging discordance between
art and truth that Heidegger locates the “domain” in which will to power
(Being) and truth meet within Nietzsche’s philosophy, and as against the
tradition, they come together in the realm of art, not in the realm of knowledge
(epistemology).
According to David Krell, Hediegger’s implication is that, “although
Nietzsche does not formalize the question of essence of truth, he removes ‘the
true’ from the realm of knowledge to the domain of art,” 80 and then goes
further, in a radical move that decisively establishes him as the last, great
“metaphysician.” When proclaiming that art is worth more to life than truth,
Nietzsche, for the first time within philosophy’s long metaphysical history,
intimates the awareness of the concern for what Being of truth, or the essence
of Being, is. When Being and truth converge in the realm of art, it is truth that
must ultimately be subordinated to the concerns of Being. Truth, as conceived
by the tradition, can never have the final word in the matter, for when
conceiving life as a growing, ascending phenomenon, and art as the highest
expression of the Being of beings as will to power, the truth of knowledge
must always remain secondary to the more primeval, profound, and essential
truth of Being. Reviewing Nietzsche’s thoughts on art, truth, and life, within
the new “sensuousness,” along with attending to the “unthought” source of his
philosophy, Heidegger determines the “oversights” present to Nietzsche’s
philosophy to be unlike any of his predecessors. Nietzsche gathers and
completes metaphysical inquiry because his thought indicates a concern for
philosophy’s need to redirect its inquiry and return to what has been forgotten
within traditional metaphysics, i.e., the focus on the most primordial aspect of
existence (Being qua Being), that which cannot be derived from anything else,
and that which is prior to all else. Nietzsche is something of a herald, giving a
sign or implication of what is to come, hinting at the essential move toward the
formalization of the concern with Being, truth, and essence – namely toward
what Heidegger refers to in Being and Time as “fundamental ontology,”81 and
herein lies the most important aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy as presented
by Heidegger. For Heidegger seems to suggest that Nietzsche recognizes,
albeit implicitly, as expressed through Nietzsche’s “unthought,” the primordial
connection between truth and Being.
Heidegger’s interpretation explicitly locates Nietzsche within the
tradition of the metaphysical thinkers who: (1) understand truth as belonging
Ibid, pg. 68.
Heidegger, Nietzsche, 236 (trans. bylator David Krell’s Analysis)
81 Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, 256/213. In Heidegger’s terms (Being and Time)
even such an implied awareness of this connection, which grounds Nietzsche’s thought in its
totality, is the understanding that “the phenomenon of truth comes within the range of the
problematic of fundamental ontology.”
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to the realm of epistemology, and (2) limit their philosophical inquiry into the
Being of beings. There are several problems with this interpretation, which
result fromHeidegger’systematic and inauthentic “metaphysicalization”of
Nietzsche.82 This occurs, as argued by Schrift, because Heidegger adopts
stringent and highly restrictive methodological choices for approaching
Nietzsche. Heidegger’s hermeneutic interpretation is limited from the outset,
and in essence, amounts to a reading of Nietzsche’s text in which Heidegger
reads “his own view of the history of philosophy in order to tell us what
Nietzsche really meant and what he really thought.”83 The three methodological
choices that structure and guide Heidegger’s reading are outlined by Schrift as
follows: (1) Heidegger focuses only on Nietzsche’s unpublished Nachlass and
the sections appearing under the heading, Will to Power and “the conception of
the ‘unsaid’ as it unfolds in his reading of Nietzsche”84; (2) Heidegger holds the
belief that Nietzsche, like all metaphysical thinkers, thinks one and only one
thought, and his thought is about “beings as a whole.” Since Heidegger seeks
to systematize the self-proclaimed “unsystematic” thinker, “Nietzsche thinks
his one and only thought, Heidegger tells us, as the thought of the Eternal
Recurrence of the Same,”85 the supposed center of Nietzsche’s metaphysics;
and (3) Heidegger holds the view that all serious philosophical thinking is
metaphysical thinking, and, as a serious thinker, Nietzsche is thus attempting to
answer the traditional metaphysical question of what beings are.
Because these methodological choices structure and severely limit
Heidegger’s reading, severe consequences follow, and Schrift argues that
Heidegger’s “dogmatic” interpretation fails in many ways to due justice to the
richness, diversity and even the contradictory nature of Nietzsche’s vast corpus
of both published and unfinished manuscripts, for all of “Nietzsche’s
psychological, anthropological, and axiological (aesthetics, ethical) insights are
subsumed under the rubric of metaphysics.”86 It is correct to question the
validity and accuracy of Heidegger’s reading the will to power in terms of a
metaphysical phenomenon that determines the ground of beings as a whole.
For example, as Schrift correctly points out, Heidegger classifies post-Cartesian
metaphysics as “voluntaristic,” wherein the concept of “will” determines the
being of beings, and Heidegger locates Nietzsche in this metaphysical tradition
which “stretches from Schopenhauer through Hegel, Schelling, and Kant to its
inception in Leibniz.”87 Such an interpretation seems inaccurate, for it is
questionable whether Nietzsche’s understanding of the “will” is identical with
the concept of “will” found in Schopenhauer. For Nietzsche states explicitly
that the will is an erroneous and false notion that arises as a fiction of grammar
when we take up a “popular prejudice” and exaggerate it by unifying a
multiplicity of drives, emotions, and affects into a single immutable source, or
Schrift, Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation, 19.
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substance. As the following passage from Beyond Good and Evil illustrates,
Nietzsche clearly espouses a view of the will that is unlike that of
Schopenhauer: “Willing seems to me to be above all something complicated,
something that is a unity only as a word.”88
It is the case that Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil was one of the many
published works that Heidegger fails to subject to his critical analysis, but as
Schrift astutely demonstrates, there are numerous passages in Will to Power
wherein Nietzsche is explicitly arguing against the existence of the will
conceived in metaphysical terms. It is not that Heidegger ignores or glosses
over these passages in Will to Power, rather, it is Heidegger’s close-reading,
guided as it is by the aforementioned methodological presuppositions, that
literally “produces” a metaphysical interpretation of the will in Nietzsche’s
thought. For example, in Will to Power, Nietzsche interrogates the general
make-up of will to power, questioning outright whether or not it is a
metaphysical phenomenon or something else: “Is ‘will to power’ a kind of ‘will’
or identical with the concept ‘will’? Is it the same thing as desiring? Or
commanding? Is it that ‘will’ of which Schopenhauer said it was the ‘in-itself of
things’?” Nietzsche responds to these queries in the following manner, which
contains a definitive anti-metaphysical tone: “My proposition is: that the will of
psychology [also the will of metaphysics] hitherto is an unjustified
generalization, that this will does not exist at all,” and, as Nietzsche continues,
what Schopenhauer calls “will” is a “mere empty word.”89 Schrift concludes
that in this instance Heidegger reads Nietzsche’s rejection of the “will to
psychology” as representing “ipso facto a rejection of all psychological inquiries
into the will.” Such a reading, “opens the way for [Heidegger’s] reduction of
Nietzsche’s psychology to metaphysics and his consideration of will to power
exclusively as a metaphysical concept.”90
In Heidegger’s reading of will to power as the Being of beings there
remains in Nietzsche’s philosophy a bifurcation of existence, Being is
juxtaposed with the notion of becoming, and this latter notion, importantly, is
ever-pervasive in Nietzsche’s thought. Just as in the foregoing analysis of the
“will” in Nietzsche, with respect to the concept of “Being” in Nietzsche’s
philosophy, we encounter a problem created by the prejudiced reading of
Heidegger. Much like the notion of will, with respect to Being, “Nietzsche
makes no such assertion of the enduring presence of will to power,” as
“Being,” as ousia,91 nor does Nietzsche endorse a dualistic view of existence as
found in traditional metaphysics. For in describing the so-called “zenith of
mankind,” Nietzsche ponders the state of the “apparent world” once the “real
world” has been done away with, “What world is left? The apparent world
perhaps? . . . But no! With the real world we have also abolished the apparent

88 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. by R. J. Hollingdale (London:
Penguin, 1990), 47-48.
89 Nietzsche, Will to Power, Section 369.
90 Schrift, Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation, 59.
91 Ibid., 62.
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world.”92 And again, in The Will to Power, Nietzsche outlines and criticizes the
“corrupt” motives underlying the quests of both Christianity and Western
metaphysics to seek a world, a second world, that lies beyond what presents
itself as “reality,” a world beyond as will, “as if outside the actual world, that of
becoming, there was another world of being.”93 By subscribing to the false
notion of “Being,” humans betray their lack of historical sense, and, motivated
by instincts of fear rather than a “pessimism of strength,” they cast Being as
eternal presence, “a concept whose origins resides in the human being’s
inability to feel secure in the ever-changing play of the world.”94 According to
Nietzsche, philosophers search for this elusive, nonexistent realm of Being,
postulating a true world behind the world of appearance, which for Nietzsche
is the only legitimate reality, because they tremble before the Heraclitean
notion of endless becoming, change, and flux. As argued by Schrift, if we
attend to what Nietzsche actually “said,” “thought,” and published, we
encounter a philosopher reminiscent of Heraclitus, who denied absolute Being,
permanence and unity, absolute substance, the very notion of Being that
permeates the history of metaphysical philosophy.
In subsuming Nietzsche’s psychology to the realm of metaphysics,
Heidegger’s interpretation covers over the importance of Nietzsche’s
“genealogical” method, which is described by Nehamas in the following
manner, “Genealogy reveals both [the] origins and the mechanisms by which
the views in question try to conceal themselves.”95 Thus, Heidegger
misinterprets that Nietzsche, as opposed to pursuing the analysis of the will to
power as the Being of beings, is actually pursuing the will to power along the
lines of a “new psychology,” and this demonstrates for Schrift that “Nietzsche
is fundamentally engaged in a project quite different from that of
metaphysics.”96 As previously stated, Nietzsche’s genealogy is quite specifically
concerned with origins and the motivations behind the manifestation of
various phenomena, concepts, and ways of being, for example, asking, out of
what sort of impulses does the will to power arise “and toward what ends are
these impulses directed?”97 Does the will to power result from life-affirming or
life negating drives? Against the pursuit of metaphysics, Nietzsche is concerned
ultimately with the transvaluation of values, which is the creation and
determination of values anew. Schrift correctly describes Nietzsche’s “psychogenealogy” as a method that functions simultaneously on a psychological and,
perhaps more importantly, an axiological level, for Nietzsche’s thinking is
never at a remove from the crucial assessment of values in the human life.
According to Schrift, in Nietzsche’s thinking, “it is the question of the value of
will to power and not the Being of will to power that is of primary
Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, 51.
Nietzsche, Will to Power, Section 51.
94 Schrift, Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation, 62.
95 Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature (Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1985), 32-33.
96 Schrift, Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation, 60.
97 Ibid., 60.
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importance.”98 In Heidegger’s exegesis, “the primacy of value inquiry is lost
within [his] overdetermined metaphysical reading.”99
Heidegger’s analysis emerges from a confrontation (Aus-einandersetzung) with Nietzsche, resulting in what Heidegger believes is a “genuine
critique” of Nietzsche’s thought. As opposed to critique as censure,
Heidegger’s confrontational critique traces Nietzsche’s thought in its “effective
force, not its weakness.”100 Such a method is the supreme way in which to
bring a philosopher and philosophy to shine most profoundly. Approaching
Nietzsche as a thinker of great importance, Heidegger rescues him from the
erroneous and damning classifications (e.g., “literary-philosopher,”
“philosopher of life”) that impugn his viable philosophical contributions.
Heidegger accomplishes what no other commentator has yet approached,
namely reading Nietzsche as the proponent of a coherent, unified philosophy,
organized around three interrelated tenets (i.e., “The Will to Power,” “Eternal
Recurrence of the Same,” and “trans. by-valuation of Values”). Heidegger’s
“systematic” interpretation appears to avoid the disastrous consequences
befalling others attempting to understand Nietzsche. For example, Jaspers, in a
state of bitter frustration, after the completion of his voluminous study, writes
disparagingly of Nietzsche’s “endless reflection and questioning,” which
Jaspers feels establishes “no foundations,” and brings forth only a series of
disturbing “new paradoxes.”101
As I have attempted to demonstrate, as much as Heidegger’s
interpretation accomplishes it is not without problems, and, as some
commentators have stated, when these problems are properly addressed, they
expose the flaws in Heidegger’s reading, which amount in the extreme to a
dogmatic misreading of Nietzsche. With that being stated, Heidegger’s
interpretation, whether severely flawed or not, still succeeds in elucidating the
fact that Nietzsche is a legitimate philosophical force who must be considered,
confronted, and perhaps, overcome. For Nietzsche expresses the ultimate
concern with “life,” and it seems that the awareness of creative life and the
“return” of life is most vital to his unique and influential ideas about humanity,
which reveal the foundations of a “new” life and existence, an existence that
fruitfully springs from the renewal of the forgotten sensual and spiritual ties to
earth, nature, and the body, a life in which humanity’s greatest possibilities are
reflected within its creative artistic activity. For Nehamas, one of the most
important innovations that Heidegger introduced to the “reading” of Nietzsche
is “the notion of the fragment” and the close-reading thereof,102 but as
Ibid., 60.
Ibid., 60.
100 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 5.
101 Jaspers, Karl, Way to Wisdom, trans. by., Ralph Manheim (New haven: Yale
University, 1951), 188. Jasper’s Nietzsche study is titled: Nietzsche: An Introduction to the
Understanding of his Philosophical Activity
102 Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, 16. Heidegger’s interpretation, according to
Nehamas, introduces the notion of the “fragment” into the study of Nietzsche. “For
Heidegger,” writes Nehamas, “the task in reading Nietzsche is to reconstruct his real thought, in
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demonstrated, this “innovation,” while holding the potential to radically change
the way philosophical analysis is done, is also a source for concern. In closing,
perhaps the comments of Schrift are most relevant to the understanding of
how to approach Heidegger’s metaphysical reading of Nietzsche: It is necessary
to perform a careful reading of both philosophers, and further, agree to “read
Nietzsche with Heidegger to appreciate the strength of the Heideggerian
interpretation.”103
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